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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 28, 2004, the United States Supreme Court released its 
much awaited decisions in the cases posing a challenge to the Execu-
tive's self-professed authority to detain and indefinitely hold individu-
als designated as "enemy combatants."l The cases arose from the "war 
on terrorism" that was launched after the attack on the United States 
on September 11, 2001.2 When each decision is looked at individually, 
* Associate, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel, LLP; Prospective Law Clerk to the Hon. H. 
Emory Widener, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; BA. with Honors, Johns Hopkins 
University 1998; J.D. cum laude, Georgetown University Law Center 2004; M.D. with Recognition, 
State University of New York at Stony Brook School of Medicine 2005. 
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Rumsfeld 
v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). Also, on June 29, 2004, the Supreme Court summarily vacated 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in another terrorism case. Bush v. 
Gherebi, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004) (mem.). Together, in this Article, these cases are referred to as the 
"Enemy Combatant Cases." 
2. As of the day the decisions came down (and ofthe day of writing of this Article), the "war 
on terrorism" was ongoing with no end in sight. 
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the result seems to make sense and, given the outcome (affording 
detainees rights of judicial review), feels good. Yet when these decisions 
are looked at collectively, it is hard to believe that they were issued by 
the same complement of Justices, much less on the same day. More-
over, when the decisions rendered on June 28, 2004, are read in 
concert with previous decisions dealing with the habeas corpus rights 
of non-citizen detainees, the legal landscape becomes quite muddled. 
This Article seeks to show inconsistencies in the three Enemy Com-
batant Cases, as well as the potentially catastrophic interaction of these 
cases with Zadvydas v. Davis, a case decided in 2001. Part II of this 
Article describes the historical and political background of these cases 
and summarizes the Supreme Court's opinion in each case. Part III 
points out the tension between these decisions and suggests that it is 
impossible for all three to be implemented as written. Part IV addresses 
the far-reaching implications of Rasui v. Bush on the present and future 
military operations and argues that that decision has the potential to 
wreak havoc on the military's ability to effectively detain and interro-
gate terrorists and prisoners of war (PaWs). Part V addresses the 
interaction of Rasui and Zadvydas and suggests that if the decisions are 
meant to be read in concert, they may require a highly implausible 
result of releasing individuals whom the military considers to be 
dangerous into the very country that these individuals wish to destroy. 
Part VI proposes a restricted construction on these decisions so as to 
limit the potential damage that these decisions can cause. The Article 
concludes its analysis in Part VII. 
II. THE CAsES AND THEIR BACKGROUND 
On the bright morning of September 11, 2001, the world shook. The 
United States was attacked by terrorists associated with al-Qaeda, a vast, 
worldwide terrorist network. Two planes crashed into the World Trade 
Center buildings in New York, bringing both buildings down, while a 
third plane crashed into the Pentagon. Yet another plane, headed for 
the U.S. Capitol or the White House, was brought down by courageous 
passengers. In all, over 3,000 people perished in the attack. On 
September 14, 2001, Congress unanimously passed a resolution autho-
rizing the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, autho-
rized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.,,3 On October 7, the 
3. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
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u.s. forces began a bombing campaign against Afghanistan,4 a country 
then ruled by the radical Islamist Taliban regime-a regime harboring 
the mastermind of September 11, 2001, attacks, Osama bin Laden.5 It is 
in this context that the Enemy Combatant Cases arose. This Part will 
describe Hamdi, Padilla, and &Sui, the Enemy Combatant Cases. 
A. Hamdi v. Rurnsfeid 
After the United States started military operations in Afghanistan, as 
would be expected, it captured a number of individuals who allegedly 
were (and are) Taliban and al-Qaeda supporters.6 Among them was 
Yaser Esam Hamdi, a Saudi national. 7 Like many other foreign-born 
individuals captured in Afghanistan and suspected of being members 
of the Taliban or al-Qaeda, Mr. Hamdi was detained and initially 
transported to Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.s 
Officials soon discovered, however, that in addition to being a Saudi 
national, Mr. Hamdi also laid a claim to U.S. citizenship, by virtue of 
having been born in Louisiana.9 Once U.S. officials discovered that Mr. 
Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, he was transferred from Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base and into the United States proper. lO The Department of 
Defense chose the military brig in Norfolk Naval Station in Norfolk, 
Virginia/ 1 as his new place of confinement. The U.S. government 
further determined that Mr. Hamdi was an "enemy combatant" and 
consequently should remain detained in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war. 12 
While being detained, Hamdi was not permitted to meet with his 
4. David Rohde, Thunderous Blasts and Bright Flashes Mark Kabul Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2001, atAI. 
5. Id. atB5. 
6. See Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Detention Camp; U.S. to Hold Taliban 
Detainees in 'the Least Worst Place, 'N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at B6 ("As of today, the United States 
was holding 45 fighters from AI Qaeda and the Taliban."). 
7. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 534 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
8. Id. at 529. For further details about Camp X-Ray, see infra Part II.C. 
9. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 2003). Mr. Hamdi has since renounced his 
U.S. citizenship as part of the deal with the Government. See infra note 41. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. Hamdi was thereafter transferred to the military brig in Charleston Naval Brig in 
Charleston, South Carolina. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2636. 
12. Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 601. 
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attorneys or anyone else, including family members,13 nor was he 
indicted or arraigned on any charges in either civilian or military 
proceedings.14 In essence he was being held as a POW but without the 
rights that the Geneva Convention accords to POWS.I5 Furthermore, 
the Government announced that the detention would last indefinitely, 
or at least until the Government itself makes a determination that 
access to counsel and the courts is warranted. I6 
On May 10, 2002, a federal public defender, Frank Dunham, filed a 
habeas corpus petition challenging the Government's detention of 
Hamdi as an enemy combatant and naming as petitioners both Hamdi 
and himself as Hamdi's next friend. I7 The petition requested an order 
from the court requiring the Government to allow the public defender 
to meet privately with Mr. Hamdi, to cease all interrogation of Mr. 
Hamdi, and to release Mr. Hamdi from "unlawful custody.,,18 The 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the petition 
insofar as it requested that Mr. Hamdi be allowed to privately meet with 
counsel. I9 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed 
but did not address the propriety of treating Mr. Hamdi as an "unlawful 
combatant.,,2o Instead, the court held that the public defender did not 
have standing to file a habeas corpus petition on Mr. Hamdi's behalf.21 
While Mr. Durham's petition on behalf ofMr. Hamdi was pending in 
the Fourth Circuit, Mr. Hamdi's father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a 
nearly identical habeas corpus petition on behalf of his son, claiming to 
be his next friend. 22 Once again, the district court granted the petition 
13. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 368 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz,]., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en bane) ("Nor has the Executive allowed Hamdi to appear in court, consult with 
counsel, or communicate in any way with the outside world."). 
14. Id. 
15. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 
118 [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3406, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 [hereinafter Geneva Convention] ("Prisoners of 
war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.") (emphasis 
added). As the duration of hostilities is indefinite (in the sense that no one knows a priori how long 
a particular war will last), so too can detention under the Convention be indetinite. See also Hamdi, 
124 S. Ct. at 2641-42 (addressing the issue of indefinite detention in light of the Geneva 
Convention); cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468-69 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting Hamdi's 
Geneva Convention claims). 
16. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2636. 
17. Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 60l. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 602 (detailing the district court's order). 
20. See id. at 607. 
21. See id. at 600. 
22. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2002). 
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insofar as it requested that Mr. Hamdi be allowed to meet privately with 
an attorney.23 Once again, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that 
the district court failed to properly consider the detainee's status as an 
"enemy combatant," or to give proper deference to the decision of the 
President and Congress regarding the conduct of war and foreign 
policy.24 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the 
district court for reconsideration.25 
Upon remand, having addressed the issues identified by the Fourth 
Circuit, the district court ordered the Government to produce support 
for its contention that Hamdi was an "enemy combatant."26 The 
Government produced a declaration (the Mobbs Declaration) by Mi-
chael Mobbs-"an unelected, otherwise unknown, government 'advi-
sor"'27 -attesting to the circumstances of Mr. Hamdi' s capture. 28 The 
district court found the Mobbs Declaration to be insufficient and 
ordered the Government to produce additional documentation includ-
ing information on the identity of the individuals who actually made 
the ultimate decision to designate Mr. Hamdi as an "enemy combatant" 
and the criteria used for such designation.29 Yet again, the Fourth 
Circuit reversed, holding that the Government's affidavit was sufficient 
and that, in any event, the district court did not have jurisdiction to 
question the Executive's designation of Hamdi as an enemy combat-
ant.30 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit held that the Geneva Conven-
tion affords Mr. Hamdi no rights to have his "enemy combatant" status 
reviewed by a court of law.31 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address, inter alia, whether 
the Constitution permit[s] Executive officials to detain an 
American citizen indefinitely in military custody in the United 
States, hold him essentially incommunicado and deny him 
access to counsel, with no opportunity to question the factual 
basis for his detention before any impartial tribunal, on the sole 
ground that he was seized abroad in a theater of the War on 
23. See id. at 281 (detailing the district court's order). 
24. ld. at 281-82. 
25. ld. at 284. 
26. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
27. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335,368 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz,J., dissenting from denial 
ofrehearing en bane). 
28. See id.; infra note 42. 
29. Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 528-29. 
30. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003). 
31. ld. at 468-69. 
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Terrorism and declared by the Executive to be an "enemy 
combatant"?32 
On June 28,2004, a splintered Court announced itsjudgment,33 with 
opinions transcending the usual "liberal-conservative" divide. 
Although no opinion garnered the necessary five votes to become an 
opinion of the Court, five Justices agreed that the indefinite34 deten-
tion of American citizens, in the narrow circumstances of this case, was 
permissible.35 At the same time, however, six Justices concluded that, 
contrary to the Fourth Circuit's view, Mr. Hamdi is indeed entitled to 
challenge his designation as an "enemy combatant" and to have an 
attorney for the purpose of such proceedings.36 The Court, however, 
did specify that given the extraordinarily sensitive nature of the military 
information, and the deference that the courts owe to the Executive in 
his determination on the conduct of war, the onus in challenging the 
"enemy combatant" designation should be placed on the detainee.37 
Furthermore, the Court allowed the Government to rely on evidence 
that in most other proceedings would be deemed undependable (e.g., 
hearsay).38 
The plurality opinion did concede that the challenge to the "unlaw-
ful combatant" status need not proceed in the civilian courtrooms, but 
may instead be adjudicated in the military tribunals.39 If such is the 
32. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2003 WL 23170355 (Oct. 31, 
2003); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (mem.) (order granting certiorari). 
33. The case produced five opinions. The plurality opinion was authored by Justice O'Connor 
and joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Breyer.Justice Souter,joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented. Justice 
Thomas also dissented, though on different grounds than Justice Scalia. 
34. The plurality opinion did make a cautionary footnote that "indefinite" means only until 
cessation of hostilities, which in turn may last for the course of Mr. Hamdi's lifetime. (Mter all, 
"hostilities" between Israelis and Palestinians have been "ongoing" for almost 60 years. Although 
one hopes that the U.S. military operations in Mghanistan would conclude well short of the 
sixty-year mark, the possibility that the operations will carry on for years, if not decades, certainly 
cannot be ruled out.) Because the Court took note of the fact that the hostilities in Mghanistan 
are still ongoing, it saw no need to delve deeper into the propriety of holding a citizen indefinitely 
when no active military operations are conducted, but the country nevertheless is in a heightened 
state of alert due to terrorist threats. 
35. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641-42 (plurality opinion); id. at 2680 (Thomas,]., dissenting). 
36. See id. at 2651-52 (plurality opinion); id. at 2660 (Souter,]., concurring injudgment). 
37. 124 S. Ct. at 2649. 
38. [d. 
39. [d. at 2651-52. Technically, this part of the opinion did not command the majority of the 
Court. See id. at 2660 (Souter,]., concurring in judgment) (specifically disavowing agreement with 
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case, the plurality would probably concede that Mr. Hamdi's choice of 
lawyers could be limited.40 In short, the Court was quite deferential to 
the powers of the Executive, but not to the point where it ceded to the 
Executive the sole, unreviewable, and unaccountable power to indefi-
nitely detain U.S. citizens.41 
B. Rumsfeld v. Padilla 
The second case decided by the Supreme Court concerned another 
U.S. citizen classified as an "enemy combatant." Although Jose Padilla 
came to be held in the same military jail and under the same status as 
Yaser Hamdi, the circumstances of his arrival there were quite differ-
ent. 
Jose Padilla was born in New York and raised in Chicago.42 He started 
having problems with the law at a very early age and was arrested for 
murder when he was fourteen. 43 He was tried as ajuvenile, convicted, 
and incarcerated until his eighteenth birthday.44 He later moved to 
Florida, where he was once again arrested and convicted on a handgun 
charge.45 Sometime between 1993 and 1994, Mr. Padilla converted to 
Islam and started referring to himself as Ibrahim Padilla.46 In 1998, he 
moved to Egypt.47 Mr. Padilla subsequently traveled to Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, and Mghanistan.48 It is alleged that during these travels Mr. 
Padilla met and became involved with senior leaders of al-Qaeda49 and 
the majority on this point). However, given Justice Thomas' view that Hamdi is not entitled to any 
additional process, it is likely that he would agree that a truncated process would not be 
constitutionally offensive. 
40. For example, the Government may impose a requirement that the attorneys be able to 
obtain security clearance and/or be on active military duty. 
41. Mter the Court handed down its decision, Mr. Hamdi and the Federal Government 
entered an agreement whereupon Mr. Hamdi renounced his U.S. citizenship and was sent to 
Saudi Arabia. Mr. Hamdi agreed to certain limitations on his activities as part of the deal. SeeJoei 
Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, Held 3 Years by U.S., Saudi Goes Home, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 13,2004, 
at 2. 
42. See Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy '\I 4 
[hereinafter Mobbs Declaration], available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/ 
padillabush82702mobbs.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2004). 
43. [d. 
44. /d. 
45. [d. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. 
48. [d. 
49. [d. '\I'll 5-6. 
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that he became a part of the plan to detonate a "dirty bomb"50 in the 
United States.51 On May 8,2002, Mr. Padilla traveled from Pakistan to 
Chicago O'Hare Airport at which point he was, pursuant to a court 
order, detained by the U.S. Marshal Service as a material witness to a 
federal grand jury investigation. 52 The grand jury was empanelled in 
the Southern District of New York, and accordingly, Mr. Padilla was 
held in New York City's Metropolitan Correctional Center. 53 
While Mr. Padilla was being held on a material witness warrant, the 
district court appointed an attorney to represent him.54 Donna New-
man, the court-appointed attorney, was allowed to confer with Mr. 
Padilla55 and subsequently moved to vacate the material witness war-
rant. However, on June 9, 2002, while the motion to vacate was 
pending, President Bush classified Mr. Padilla as an "enemy combat-
ant" and ordered the Secretary of Defense to detain Mr. Padilla.56 
Secretary Rumsfeld then ordered Mr. Padilla held at the Charleston 
Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina. 57 Mter Mr. Padilla was 
moved to South Carolina, Ms. Newman filed a habeas petition onJune 
11,2002, as Mr. Padilla's "next friend" in the Southern District of New 
York.58 Secretary Rumsfeld was named as the respondent in the peti-
tion.59 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, like 
the district court in Hamdi's case, held that Mr. Padilla's lawyer can 
style herself as "next friend" and, accordingly, had standing to pursue 
50. "Dirty bomb" is a regular explosive device that is enhanced with radioactive material. 
Although not a true nuclear weapon (because instead of causing a nuclear reaction, a "dirty 
bomb" merely causes the fallout of "prepackaged" nuclear material), the damage from a "dirty 
bomb" exceeds that of the regular explosive device due to the release of nuclear material. For a 
quick summary on "dirty bombs," see U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N, Fact Sheet on Dirty Bombs, available 
at http://www.nrc.gov /reading-rm/ doc-collections/fact-sheets/ dirty-bombs.html (last visited Nov. 
29,2004). 
51. Mobbs Declaration, supra note 42 'll'll 7-8. 
52. Id. 'll11. 
53. See Padilla ex rei. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. Additionally, after the habeas petition was filed, Ms. Newman conferred with Mr. 
Padilla's relatives and with government representatives on Padilla's behalf. Id. at 572. 
56. Id. at 571; see also President's Order to the Secretary of Defense to Detain Jose Padilla Uune 9, 
2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/ docs/ padilla/ padillabush60902det.pdf (last 
visited July 31,2004). 
57. See 233 F. Supp. 2d at 571. 
58. Id. 
59. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2716. The petition also named President Bush and Melanie Marr, 
Commander of the Charleston Naval Brig, as respondents. Id. 
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the habeas petition.60 Additionally, the district court rejected the 
Government's argument that Secretary Rumsfeld was not a proper 
respondent and that the warden of the Charleston Naval Brig should 
have been named instead. 61 The district court then ordered the 
Government to allow Mr. Padilla access to an attorney62 and the 
opportunity to rebut the Government's contention that he is an 
"enemy combatant.,,63 The Government appealed, and the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, one judge dissenting, affirmed the 
district court. The Court of Appeals also ordered Secretary Rumsfeld to 
release Mr. Padilla from military custody and transfer him to civilian 
authorities.64 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve, inter 
alia, whether the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
had personal jurisdiction over the proper respondent to the habeas 
petition.65 
On June 28, together with the Hamdi decision, the Supreme Court 
rendered its judgment in Rumsfeld v. Padilla. In a 5-4 decision,66 the 
Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that the warden of Charles-
ton Naval Brig was the proper respondent, rather than Secretary 
Rumsfeld.67 Thus, the Court continued, the petition should have been 
brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina and 
not in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.68 
In reaching this decision, the Court recognized that allowing a prisoner 
to sue the high-level official in any jurisdiction where that official would 
be amenable to long-arm jurisdiction, instead of suing the immediate 
captor locally, would encourage "rampant forum shopping" and result 
60. Newman, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 578. 
61. Id. The district court actually dismissed Commander Marr as the respondent because the 
court did not view her as a necessary party to the dispute. Id. at 583. 
62. Id. at 610. 
63. Id. at 599-600. 
64. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 698-99 (2d Cir. 2003). It is at this point that the Second 
Circuit disagreed with the District Court. While the District Court was of the view that the 
President was authorized and could detain U.S. citizens as "enemy combatants," provided that 
these individuals can contest the designation, the Court of Appeals held otherwise. Compare 
Newman, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 588, with Padilla, 352 F.3d at 724. For the purpose of the Supreme 
Court's opinion, however, that distinction did not matter. 
65. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (mem.) (order granting certiorari). 
66. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the decision in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens' 
dissenting opinion. Additionally, Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in which Justice 
O'Connor joined. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2711. 
67. Id. at 2721-22. 
68. Id. at 2727. 
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in "district courts with overlapping jurisdiction, and the very inconve-
nience, expense, and embarrassment Congress sought to avoid when it 
added the jurisdictional limitation [to the habeas corpus statute] 137 
years ago.,,69 
In footnote nine, the majority did recognize that in the past it 
allowed suits against high level officials when the immediate jailer was 
outside of the jurisdiction of any U.S. district court. However, the Court 
carefully noted that in the past this exception applied to U.S. citizens 
only.70 As detailed below, that last limitation apparently no longer 
holds. 
C. Rasul v. Bush 
Rasul v. Bush was the third of the Enemy Combatant Cases. The facts 
of the case closely track those of Hamdi, with the exception that none of 
the individuals involved are U.S. citizens. The individuals named in 
Rasul (and others similarly situated) are all foreign nationals, captured 
in Mghanistan during U.S. military operations there. Mter being 
captured, these individuals were transferred to the Guantanamo Naval 
Base, Cuba, and have been held there to the present day.71 
On February 19,2002, the relatives ofShafiq Rasul, a detainee in the 
Guantanamo Bay Base, filed a habeas petition in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia.72 In their petition, President George W. 
Bush was named as a respondent.73 The district court held that because 
the petitioners were located outside of the United States, the court 
could not grant them the relief requested.74 The court based its 
holding on the fact that Guantanamo Bay Base is technically Cuban 
territory, held by the U.S. under the terms of a (nearly) perpetual 
lease.75 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
unanimously affirmed.76 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
address the question of "[w]hether United States courts lackjurisdic-
69. ld. at 2725. 
70. ld. at 2718 n.9. 
71. Rasu~ 124 S. Ct. at 2690-91. 
72. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub nom. AI Odah v. United 
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). Rasul's 
petition was consolidated with several others, but the backgrounds of these cases are quite similar, 
so there is little need to identify each plaintiff and his specific circumstances. 
73. SeeAl Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
74. Rasu~ 215 F. Supp. 2d at 72-73. 
75. ld. 
76. AIOdak, 321 F.3d at 1143. 
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tion to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign 
nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcer-
ated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.'>77 
The Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Rasui together with 
the two other Enemy Combatant Cases. The decision was unexpected. 
The court ruled, 6-3,78 that foreign citizens being detained by the U.S. 
Government have the right to have U.S. courts hear their challenges to 
the legality and the propriety of that detention.79 The decision is 
notable for several points. First, it is the first time that the Court 
explicitly stated that foreign citizens located outside of the United 
States can sue the U.S. Government.80 Second, the Court focused on 
the fact that, although Guantanamo Bay Base is technically Cuban 
territory, the United States has exercised, exercises, and likely will 
continue to exercise full jurisdiction and control over the territory for 
the foreseeable future. Therefore, according to the Court, the Guan-
tanamo Base should be treated as if it actually were sovereign U.S. 
territory.81 The focus on Guantanamo's unique status makes it difficult 
to judge how far down the battlefield the Court is willing to interpose 
itself.82 Next, unlike the decision in Hamdi that explicitly allowed for 
adjudicatory proceedings to occur before a military tribunal (or com-
77. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Rasul v. Bush, 2003 WL 22428935 (Sept. 2, 2003); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (mem.) (order granting certiorari). 
78. Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion in which Justices O'Connor, Souter, 
Breyer, and Ginsburg joined. Justice Kennedy concurred in judgment. The Chief Justice and 
Justice ThomasjoinedJustice Scalia's dissenting opinion. Rasu~ 124 S. Ct. at 2686. 
79. Rasu~ 124 S. Ct. at 2698; see also id. at 2706 (Scalia,]., dissenting) (stating that the majority 
"for the first time" allowed aliens outside the United States to sue for habeas relief). 
80. The Court's previous opinions did raise such a possibility, but the extent of those 
opinions was not clear until RasuL See Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973). 
Then again, as discussed in this Article, the extent of Rasul is far from clear as well, and we most 
likely will have to wait for another pronouncement from the Court in order to have a clearer idea 
of the rights and obligations of the U.S. Government vis-a.-vis foreign nationals. 
81. See Rasu~ 124 S. Ct. at 2696-97. 
82. The Court was careful to specifY that it held only that the "District Court [has] 
jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base." [d. at 2698 (emphasis added). The Court could have just as easily 
ended the above sentence with the word "detention," without speciJYing the location of that 
detention. The fact that it chose to add "at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base" may mean that the 
decision applies only to Guantanamo, and does not extend beyond it. Nonetheless, in light of the 
Court's view that in order for the Great Writ to be granted only the respondent must be within the 
court's geographical jurisdiction, it cannot be ruled out that the Rasul decision extends beyond 
Guantanamo's gates. See infra Part N. 
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mission), the Rasui decision makes no such concession.83 Finally, Rasui 
is notable for the fact that in the entire 45-page decision, RumsJeid v. 
Padilla, a case ostensibly decided by the same Court, with the same nine 
Justices, is mentioned only once, and only injustice Scalia's dissent.84 It 
is these last two points that make the Court'sjurisprudence in this area 
incoherent. 
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE THREE DECISIONS 
As alluded to above, the three decisions handed down by the 
Supreme Court onJune 28, 2004, neither are a model of clarity nor do 
they fully harmonize with one another. Indeed, each of the opinions 
completely ignores the existence of the other twO.85 Given the fact that 
an unambiguous resolution of all three cases would greatly illuminate 
the legal problems surrounding the ongoing "war on terror," the 
Supreme Court's performance is, to say the least, inadequate. This Part 
discusses how, by failing to provide the Executive and the lower courts 
with proper guidance, the Supreme Court assured itself of further 
litigation and continued uncertainty regarding detainees' rights and 
the powers of the Government. 
A. The Interaction oJHamdi and Rasul 
The majorities for Hamdi and for Rasui were quite different,86 so 
perhaps it is no surprise that the decisions read differently. Yet Justice 
O'Connor and Justice Kennedy, who both agreed with the conclusion 
that U.S. citizen "enemy combatants" may not necessarily be entitled to 
adjudicate their claims in federal courts, so long as they have some 
avenue of challenging their status,87 expressed no such certainty in 
cases of non-U .S. citizen "enemy combatants." Furthermore, the remain-
ing members of the Rasui majority either explicitly rejected or, at the 
very least, cast grave doubt on their acceptance of a "truncated" habeas 
83. Granted, the Court did not say that such a procedure would be inappropriate. However, it 
is noteworthy that the Court explicitly authorized proceedings in the military system with respect 
to a U.S. citizen, but declined to do so (though reserving that question) in the case of foreign 
nationals. 
84. 124 S. Ct. at 2711 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
85. Not one opinion even cites to the other two, except in concurrences or dissents. 
86. Compare Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2633, with Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2686. 
87. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (plurality opinion); Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2686 (majority 
opinion); id. at 2699 (Kennedy,]., concurring). 
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process for "enemy combatants.,,88 Reading the two decisions together, 
one is struck by the failure of Rasul's majority or concurrence even to 
mention the possibility of litigating a detainee's status in a non-Article 
III court. In other words, it may well be that the import of Hamdi and 
Rasulis that the Government may not adjudicate Guantanamo Bay Base 
detainees' status in military tribunals but may do so for U.S. citizens 
detained on U.S. soi1.89 If this conclusion sounds improbable, that is 
because it is. It may well be that if and when the issue of sufficiency of 
process for Guantanamo Bay Base detainees reaches the Supreme 
Court, a different majority may conclude that military commission 
status review is sufficient.90 However, it is, to say the least, sloppy 
decision-making and opinion-writing not only to leave the question of 
the type of process due to the non-citizen detainees open but also to 
completely fail to even mention the issue. The sloppiness is all the more 
obvious in light of the fact that this very issue was discussed in some 
detail with respect to American U.S. citizen detainees.91 
Additionally, although Hamdi makes relatively clear the conse-
qu~nces of finding a U.S. citizen not to be an enemycombatant,92 Rasul 
leaves that question open with respect to non-citizens. There is no 
question that the U.S. Government may prosecute Mr. Hamdi (or Mr. 
Padilla) in criminal courts.93 Indeed, the Government already has 
exercised such an option with respect to another so-called American 
Taliban.94 It is altogether unclear whether criminal procedures can be 
applied with the same force and effectiveness to non-citizen detainees. 
88. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2652-53 (Souter,]., concurring injudgment); id. at 2660 (Scalia, 
]., dissenting). As noted, supra note 33, in Hamdi,Justice GinsburgjoinedJustice Souter's opinion, 
while Justice StevensjoinedJustice Scalia's opinion. 
89. Indeed, the Government quickly moved to provide detainees with a military "Review 
Commission," but some legal scholars already expressed reservations as to the sufficiency of such a 
mechanism. See Christopher Marquis, Pentagon Will Permit Captives at Cuba Base to Appeal Status, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 7, 2004, at A4 (describing the proposed process and stating that legal experts have 
expressed doubts about the constitutional adequacy of new procedures). 
90. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
91. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2651-52. 
92. Although the opinion itself does not mention what such consequences would be, if Mr. 
Hamdi and Mr. Padilla indeed did what they are accused of doing, there is little question that they 
could be prosecuted in a regular criminal trial. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2000) (specifYing the 
type of prohibited terrorism-related conduct and penalties therefor); § 2339A (prohibiting 
provision of any aid to terrorists). 
93. See supra note 92. 
94. See Indictment of John Phillip Walker Lindh, United States v. Lindh, Crim. No. 02-37a 
(E.O. Va. Feb. 5, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/lindh/uswlindh020502cmp. 
pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2004); see also Plea Agreement of John Phillip Walker Lindh, United States v. 
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Although U.S. laws do allow for prosecution of foreign nationals for 
crimes committed against U.S. citizens, even if such crimes are commit-
ted on foreign soil,95 it is altogether unclear that resisting invading U.S. 
forces is a crime.96 Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute that it is quite 
undesirable (at least from the U.S. perspective) to have anyone offer 
armed resistance to U.S. forces and that it is even less desirable to have 
anyone perpetrating acts of terrorism in a region where the United 
States may have vital interests (whether or not these acts are targeted at 
U.S. citizens). It then follows that it is desirable to isolate and detain 
individuals who have or may impede the progress of U.S. forces abroad. 
This is not the same as advocating for preventive detention but merely a 
recognition of the fact that someone may have been a member of the 
Taliban (perhaps even a high-ranking member) and yet not have been 
a combatant. If one is not a combatant, it is doubtful that he could be 
an "enemy combatant;" nonetheless, it may not be prudent to release 
former Taliban members when the situation in Afghanistan is far from 
stable. The U.S. Government may then be faced with an untenable 
situation. If the detainee is able to show that he was not a combatant, 
presumably the courts would be bound to order the military to release 
that individual. In the case of a U.S. citizen, the Government may then 
continue to detain this individual in connection with any criminal 
prosecution that it may bring.97 However, in the case of a non-citizen, it 
is altogether unclear what actions the Government can take to prevent 
the return of this individual to the zone of ongoing conflict. The 
practical result of the Court's decisions, therefore, is to give the 
Government more options with respect to U.S. citizens and fewer 
options with respect to non-citizens. The result is counter-intuitive and 
in all likelihood wrong or, at the very least, unintended. In either case, 
the result suggests that the Court lacked sufficient intellectual rigor to 
resolve the two cases in a manner in which at the very least the U.S. 
Government is not more constrained with respect to non-citizens than 
it is with respect to U.S. citizens. 
lindh, Crim. No. 02-37a (E.D. Va. Feb. 5, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ 
lindh/uslindh71502pleaag.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2004). 
95. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2000). 
96. Although § 2332(c) of Title 18 provides for penalties for anyone acting with intent to 
cause serious injury to a U.S. national (and it can be safely assumed that anyone firing on U.s. 
soldiers intends to cause such injury), international law prohibits the prosecution of those 
engaged in legitimate anned conflict between nations. See generally Geneva Convention, supra note 
15, art. 4 (recognizing that captured members ofthe opponent's anned forces are POWs and not 
common criminals). 
97. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Interaction of Padilla and Rasul 
The inconsistencies between Hamdi and Rasul are not the only ones 
that are present in the trio of decisions. There are also glaring inconsis-
tencies and omissions between Padilla and Rasul. This Part is dedicated 
to illuminating the flaws in these decisions. 
The Padilla Court recognized that, although the courts may be a 
necessary counterbalance and check on the Executive's ability to 
indefinitely detain individuals, the jurisdiction of the courts is limited. 
The Supreme Court was understandably wary of prisoners challenging 
their detention in a variety of jurisdictions, hoping to have their case 
heard by a more sympathetic set of judges.98 The Court also under-
stood that the Executive would be unduly hampered if it had to defend 
against habeas proceedings in a variety of jurisdictions.99 Taking all 
these facts into account, the Court, consistent with its prior rulings, 
limited prisoners' ability to litigate to the jurisdiction where their 
immediate captor is located. No such restriction was placed on non-
U.S. citizen individuals held outside the U.S. sovereign territory. 
In Padilla the Court recognized that U.S. laws allow federal courts to 
hear habeas petitions only within their territorial jurisdiction. 100 At the 
same time the Court recognized that since the Great Writ is directed to 
the jailer, the jailer (as opposed to the prisoner) must be within the 
98. See Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2725. I do not mean to imply that some judges are less cognizant 
of the limits of their judicial power or are automatically more predisposed to rule against the 
Government and for the detainee. However, it should be beyond dispute that some judges take a 
broader view of rights guaranteed to prisoners under the laws and the Constitution of the United 
States than do others. Compare 20 Questions for CircuitJudge Stephen Reinhardt of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Justice William Brennan ... had a broad and generous, rather 
than a cramped and niggardly, view of the law and its functions."), available at http:/ / 
legalaffairs.org/howappealing/20q/2004_02_ 0 1_20q-appellateblo~archive.html (last visited Jan. 
21,2005), with 20 Questions for Circuit Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Apart from Judge Hand's superb craftsmanship, I admire his 
skepticism with respect to his proper role as an unelectedjudge in a democratic society, which led 
to his modest approach to judging, and to his advocacy of judicial restraint."), available at 
http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing/20q/2003_03_01_20q-appellateblo~archive.html (last vis-
itedJan. 21, 2005) (Both judges were responding to a question that asked them to identifY "one 
federal or state court judge, living or dead, whom you admire the most and explain why."). It 
would therefore stand to reason that prisoners would prefer to litigate in front of the first rather 
than the second set of judges. 
99. Seeid. 
100. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2722 ("[F]or ... habeas petitions challenging present physical 
confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement."). 
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territorial jurisdiction of a given district court. 101 Of course, in the case 
of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, neither the jailer nor the prisoner is 
located within the jurisdiction of any district court. Other U.S. territo-
ries have specific district courts to adjudicate cases arising in that 
territory.102 Thus, Congress clearly knew how to create a court that 
would have jurisdiction for cases arising outside of the fifty states. 
Congress also knew how to hold territory without creating federal 
district court jurisdiction.103 That Congress has failed to create a 
district court with jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay Naval Base is 
beyond dispute. It is therefore clear that no district court has jurisdic-
tion over either the prisoner or the immediate jailer. Yet the Supreme 
Court easily dispensed with this problem and allowed Guantanamo Bay 
detainees access to U.S. courts. The Court achieved this result by 
allowing the detainees to sue the President as the 'Jailer-in-chief.,,104 
Although the decision to allow Guantanamo Bay Naval Base detain-
ees to challenge their detention in court "solved" the problem of 
having no specific court to hear detainees' claims, it created a different 
problem by essentially allowing any court to hear those claims.l05 That 
of course places Rasul in direct conflict with Padilla. Once again, the 
101. [d. at 2723 ("[H]abeas jurisdiction requires only 'that the court issuing the writ have 
jurisdiction over the custodian. ''') (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 495). 
102. For example, there is a District Court for the District of U.S. Virgin Islands, with the 
Third Circuit having appellate jurisdiction. See 48 U.S.C. § 1611 (2000). There is also a District 
Court for the District of Guam and a District Court for Northern Mariana Islands, with the Ninth 
Circuit having appellate jurisdiction. See 48 U.S.C. §§ 1424, 1821 (2000). Additionally, there is a 
District Court for Puerto Rico with the First Circuit having appellate jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.c. 
§ 119 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 41(2000) (defining composition of federal Circuit Courts of 
Appeals). 
103. Indeed, as far back as 1810, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress can hold 
territory and assign such powers to the judiciary within that territory as it deems advisable. SeeSere 
v. Pitot 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332,336-37 (1810) (emphasis added): 
The power of governing and of legislating for a territory is the inevitable consequence 
of the right to acquire and to hold territoI]'... . Accordingly, we find Congress 
possessing and exercising the absolute and undisputed power of governing and legislating 
for the territory of Orleans. Congress has given them a legislative, an executive, and a 
judiciary, with such powers as it has been their will 10 assign to those departments 
respectively. 
104. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698 (stating that the District Court for the District of Columbia 
has jurisdiction over the custodian, with the implication being that the custodian is the named 
respondent, i.e., the President). 
105. See id. at 2711 (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("[U]nder today's strange holding Guantanamo 
Bay detainees can petition in any of the 94 federal judicial districts."). 
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Court created a situation where non-citizens held outside the United 
States are in a more advantageous position than U.S. citizens held 
within the United States. As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, "[t]he 
fact that extraterritorially located detainees lack the district of deten-
tion that the statute requires has been converted from a factor that 
precludes their ability to bring a petition at all into a factor that frees 
them to petition wherever they wish-and, as a result, to forum 
shop.,,106 
The Court apparently recognized the incoherence of such an ap-
proach and signaled that perhaps the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia is the only appropriate forum to hear Guan-
tanamo Bay Naval Base detainees' claims. While Rasul was being 
decided, another case was pending before the Court.107 In that case, a 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base detainee's brother filed a habeas corpus 
petition on behalf of his detainee-brother in the U.S. District Court for 
the Central District of California. !Os Contrary to the D.C. Circuit's 
holding, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it 
had jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition. 109 On June 30, 2004, the 
Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment in an unsigned 
order and remanded the case to that court to reconsider in light of 
Padilla.110 This action indicates that the Supreme Court is at the very 
least uncomfortable with the notion of Guantanamo Bay detainees 
litigating in any of the 94 judicial districts and, consequently, forum 
shopping. Nonetheless, adjudicating by cryptic orders is not a paragon 
of judicial lucidity and gives little guidance to lower courts as to why the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (which is without 
jurisdiction as to Guantanamo Bay) is a better (or more appropriate) 
forum than the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 
(which is also without jurisdiction as to Guantanamo Bay). Mter all, the 
President (in his official capacity) is amenable to the service of process 
(and thus jurisdiction) in any judicial district, and given the resources 
of the federal government it is unclear why it would be inconvenient to 
litigate these cases in a federal district court other than the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia. In actuality, it may well be that the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida is a more 
appropriate forum than the U.S. District Court for the District of 
106. Id. 
107. See Bush v. Gherebi, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004). 
108. Gherebi v. Bush, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
109. Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003). 
110. Gherebi, 124 S. Ct. at 2932. 
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Columbia; after all, the former is geographically proximate to Guan-
tanamo Bay, while the latter is quite far removed. Hence, it is altogether 
unclear why the D.C. District should have exclusive jurisdiction over 
Guantanamo Bay. 
The uncertainty created by the interaction of Padilla and &sul is 
eviden t in the Nin th Circuit's decision in Gherebi on remand. III There, 
the Ninth Circuit held to the view that it possessed jurisdiction to hear 
cases from Guantanamo Bayll2 but held that transfer to the D.C. 
District Court was appropriate. ll3 The Court of Appeals did not con-
cede that the transfer was mandatory and, indeed, cited as the basis for 
the transfer both 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (discretionary transfer for conve-
nience of the parties) and § 1406 (mandatory transfer if venue is 
improper and a party makes a timely objection) .114 Thus, it seems that, 
although federal courts will transfer cases from Guantanamo Bay to the 
D.C. District out of prudential considerations, it is not altogether clear 
that the courts would view themselves under an obligation to do so. 
Therefore, as a matter of rights, the Guantanamo Bay detainees are in a 
better situation than U.S. citizens detained in Charleston. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE ENEMY COMBATANT CAsES ON MILITARY 
OPERATIONS 
Beyond the internal inconsistencies, the Enemy Combatant Cases 
have a potentially far-reaching impact on the future operations of the 
U.S. military and intelligence-gathering services.1l5 To be sure, the 
Court did use language that could be viewed as carefully circumscribed, 
yet, if one takes the logic of the decisions to its ultimate conclusion, the 
results could well be grotesque.1l6 
It is true that the writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy 
and is generally available only when there are no other means of 
Ill. See Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2004). 
112. Id. at 738 ("In sum, we hold that neither Johnson v. Eisentrager nor any other legal 
precedent precludes our assertion of jurisdiction over Gherebi's habeas petition.") (emphasis 
added). 
113. Id. at 739. 
114. Id. 
115. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia,]., dissenting) ("The consequence of this holding, as 
applied to aliens outside the country, is breathtaking. It permits an alien captured in a foreign 
theater of active combat to bring a § 2241 petition against the Secretary of Defense."). 
116. See id. at 2706. 
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securing the Government's compliance.1l7 The "Great Writ," as it has 
been called, is the last resort of the imprisoned. I IS That, in and of itself, 
however, should not be sufficient to craft new rules of jurisdiction and 
expand courts' powers to areas traditionally reserved to Congress and 
the Executive. If habeas is so used, no principled reasons exist as to 
why, in the same situation, other extraordinary remedies available to 
the judicial branch should not be employed with equal force. 
In the course of its military operations in Mghanistan, the U.S. forces 
captured a number of Taliban and al-Qaeda members, many of whom 
were not Mghani citizens.1l9 Mter detaining and interrogating them, 
these individuals were often turned over to their home governments.120 
Additionally, U.S. forces have employed interrogation methods that 
certainly would not pass muster in U.S. jails. For example, in interrogat-
ing Abu Zubaydah, a high-ranking al-Qaeda operative, U.S. forces 
withheld painkillers, despite the fact that Mr. Zubayda was suffering 
from several gunshot wounds. 121 Other methods specifically designed 
to humiliate the prisoners have also been employed.122 All of these 
have occurred while the suspects were in U.S. custody and under U.S. 
control. If one takes the Supreme Court at its word-that it is not the 
territorial sovereignty but the actual physical custody that gives the 
federal courts jurisdiction-it then follows that all of these practices are 
subject to judicial review. Accordingly, the prisoners held by the U.S. 
military and intelligence services (regardless of where they are held) 
can petition the U.S. courts for writs of habeas corpus or other 
extraordinary relief. 123 For example, following the Supreme Court's 
logic, there is no particular reason as to why individuals being held by 
U.S. forces in foreign countries could not petition for a writ of 
117. See Wade v. Mayo, 334 u.s. 672, 694-95 (1948) ("[F]ederal courts should not utilize 
habeas corpus ... except in extraordinary situations where otherwise the accused would be 
remediless.") (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
118. C! Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) ("Since habeas corpus is an 
extraordinary remedy whose operation is to a large extent uninhibited by traditional rules of 
finality and federalism, its use has been limited to cases of special urgency, leaving more 
conventional remedies for cases in which the restraints on liberty are neither severe nor 
immediate."). 
119. For example, prisoners in Rasulwere not Mghani citizens. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690. 
120. Don Van Natta,Jr. et aI., Threats and Responses: Interrogations; Questioning Terror Suspects In 
a Dark and Surreal World, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at AI. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. See 28 U.S.c. § 1651 (allowing federal judges to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate 
in aid oftheir respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles oflaw"). 
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prohibition or a writ of mandamus. 124 Through these writs the detain-
ees could attempt to prevent the United States from transferring them 
to third countries or to require the United States to provide them with 
medications or other items that the prisoners deem necessary. It is 
conceivable that Saddam Hussein, who is being physically held by U.S. 
forces (though legally in Iraqi custody) 125 could petition the District 
Court for the District of Columbia seeking a prohibition from being 
physically turned over to the new Iraqi authorities.126 Surely, this 
cannot be the result envisioned by the Supreme Court. 
It may be argued that the courts would reject most, if not all, of such 
claims and would give due deference to military operations. That 
answer does not suffice. Even if the courts eventually reject the detain-
ees' claims, it would still be an unbelievable imposition on field 
commanders to respond to the prisoners' claims. It would be an even 
larger imposition on U.S. foreign policy to have to explain to a federal 
judge the return of prisoners to their home countries. 
In addition to the potential parade of horribles that has been 
ushered in by the Supreme Court, there are unanswered practical 
questions even in the limited situation of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. 
It seems beyond dispute, and the Supreme Court has recognized, that 
the interrogation of detainees can and does serve an invaluable military 
and intelligence-gathering function. 127 It should be equally obvious 
that effective interrogation cannot be completed in a matter of hours 
or often even days.128 All too often, weeks and months are necessary to 
pry even a minute amount of information from an unwilling de-
124. See Rasui, 124 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia,]., dissenting) ("The consequence of this holding, as 
applied to aliens outside the country, is breathtaking. It pennits an alien captured in a foreign 
theater of active combat to bring a § 2241 petition against the Secretary of Defense."). If § 2241 
can be utilized by non-U.S. citizen prisoners held abroad, there is no reason why § 1651 cannot. 
Mter all, writs of mandamus and prohibition are also directed at the government official and not 
at the prisoner. Therefore, the jurisdictional question is no different in these cases than in RasuL 
125. See Ian Fisher & John F. Burns, Court Hands Legal Custody of Saddam Hussein to Iraq, N.Y. 
TIMEs,June 10,2004, atA10. 
126. This is more than mere fanciful speculation. For example, the Supreme Court was 
presented with a petition to review Saddam Hussein's detention. The Court declined it because 
Mr. Hussein did not personally sign an affidavit of indigency. See In re Saddam Hussein, 125 S. Ct. 
239 (2004) (mem.) (order denying petition to proceed in forma pauperis without affidavit of 
indigency executed by petitioner). 
127. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2651 ("An interrogation by one's captor, however effective an 
intelligence-gathering tool, hardly constitutes a constitutionally adequate factfinding before a neutral 
decisionmaker.") (emphasis added). 
12~. See, e.g., Van Natta, supra note 120 (discussing interrogations that have lasted days). 
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tainee. 129 A fortiori, it is necessary to keep such detainee from contact-
ing the outside world, lest such contacts reinforce his strength and 
resolve to resist American interrogators.13o It then follows that the 
prolonged incommunicado detentiori of these individuals is of para-
mount importance to U.S. security. 
The question therefore arises: at what point should the detainees be 
able to petition the courts for a writ of habeas corpus? Generally, when 
an individual is detained in the Unite States, he has a right to be 
brought before a magistrate within forty-eight hours of detention. 131 
Bringing a person captured in the field of military operations and 
suspected of being a member of a terrorist organization before a 
magistrate within forty-eight hours is not just impractical, it is impos-
sible. Thus, a new timeframe must be designed. However, given the 
highly individualistic approaches to interrogation, a one-size-fits-all 
rule is likely to prove counterproductive. In the criminal context, the 
one-size-fits-all approach works because, at the end of the day, all 
defendants are entitled to the same basic rights at trial. 
In the case of terrorism detainees, however, there may never be a 
trial, as it is not at all clear that they violated any U.S. laws. The purpose 
behind holding these individuals is twofold. First, they are held to 
prevent them from rejoining their comrades in arms in their fight 
against U.S. forces. Second, and more pertinent, they are held in order 
to elicit information on the whereabouts and plans of other al-Qaeda 
officials. As already explained, eliciting this information could take 
months. 132 Allowing people to meet with attorneys before that time 
may, and likely will, impede the investigation. 133 Furthermore, prior to 
obtaining any information, it may be difficult for the Government to 
show to the satisfaction of the court that the individual in question is 
indeed an enemy combatant and does indeed consort with terrorists. 
Thus, by hearing habeas petitions too early, the courts may impede the 
Government's ability to gather information and to effectively conduct 
military and anti-terrorist operations. On the other hand, it is alto-
gether unclear what point in time the courts will view as not too early. 
In any event, detainees will be tempted to seek habeas review early and 
129. [d. ("The officials say the most effective interrogation methods involve a mix of 
psychological disorientation, physical deprivation and ingratiating acts, all of which can take weeks 
or months.") (emphasis added). 
130. [d. 
131. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). 
132. See supra note 129 and the accompanying text. 
133. See supra note 130 and the accompanying text. 
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often, thus interrupting the Government's information gathering. The 
courts, of course, will have no guidance to decide when the person has 
been detained long enough to vitiate any intelligence value that he may 
have had at some point in time. This lack of ability to correctly judge 
the necessary detention length will result in either inconsistent and 
haphazard adjudication or, equally problematic, a too rigid standard 
that may not be applicable (though it will be applied) to all situations. 
In its decisions, the Supreme Court has essentially announced that 
the principles underlying the U.S. criminal justice system also apply to 
military detainees, although potentially in a scaled-back form. 134 How-
ever, the Court has failed to appreciate that the principles designed to 
assure a fair trial have little, if any, application to a situation where 
interrogation and prevention of future terrorist activity are the overrid-
ing issues. The Court has also extended judicial power to the areas 
where it is least suited. Interposing the judiciary, however minimally, 
between the U.S. military and individuals captured by U.S. forces is 
likely to put a strain not only on military and intelligence operations 
but potentially on U.S. foreign relations as well. 135 
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF GRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
By now it should be clear that the Enemy Combatant Cases suffer 
from internal inconsistencies and potentially lead to results not at all 
envisioned by the Court. There is also an additional and absurd twist to 
the Court'sjurisprudence in this area. It comes from the interaction of 
the Enemy Combatant Cases and Zadvydas v. Davis,136 a 2001 ruling 
from the Supreme Court. 
In Zadvydas, an immigrant born in Germany but of Lithuanian 
descent was being held by the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) pending deportation. 137 However, Germany refused to accept 
Mr. Zadvydas, claiming that he was not a German citizen despite having 
134. See Rnsul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698 ("We therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the District 
Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention 
at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base."). 
135. Id. at 2711 (Scalia,]., dissenting) ("For this Court to create such a monstrous scheme in 
time of war, and in frustration of our military commanders' reliance upon clearly stated prior law, 
is judicial adventurism of the worst sort. "). 
136. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
137. Id. at 684. Mr. Zadvydas was ordered deported in 1994, after Lithuania regained its 
independence from the fonner Soviet Union. Id. 
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been born there. I3s Lithuania also refused to accept Mr. Zadvydas, 
claiming that he never became a Lithuanian citizen. 139 The INS tried to 
deport Mr. Zadvydas to his wife's home country (the Dominican 
Republic) but that, too, proved unsuccessful. 140 In short, Mr. Zadvydas 
quickly became a man without a country. During the entire removal 
process, which lasted for several years, the INS kept Mr. Zadvydas in 
custody.141 Eventually, Mr. Zadvydas filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus claiming that the Government would never be able to remove 
him from the United States (because no country was willing to accept 
him) and, therefore, detention during the removal proceedings would 
in effect amount to perpetual detention. 142 The Supreme Court agreed. 
In a 5-4 opinion,143 the Court held that the Government may detain an 
alien for the purposes of removal only for a "reasonable" period of time 
and that, generally, six months is the outer limit of reasonableness.144 
Accordingly, the Court ordered that an alien who can show that there is 
no likelihood of being removed in the "foreseeable future" must be 
released from confinement.145 
The impact of Zadvydas on the situation of the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees could be enormous. Let us assume a situation where a 
detainee successfully challenges his "enemy combatant" status before 
the court. Upon such a successful challenge, the court would issue a 
writ of habeas corpus. The Government consequently would no longer 
be entitled to hold the individual as an enemy combatant. Of course, 
the Government could continue to detain that individual pending his 
removal from the United States (or the U.S. base in Cuba) and, 
138. Id. Mr. Zadvydas was born to Lithuanian parents who were held in a displaced persons 
camp in Germany. His parents were not residents of Germany; Mr. Zadvydas, therefore, could not 
lay a claim to German nationality. Id. 
139. Id. Lithuanian law allows for descendants of people who held Lithuanian citizenship 
prior to June 15, 1940, (the date of Lithuania's occupation and annexation by the USSR) to claim 
Lithuanian citizenship in their own right. REpUBLIC OF LITHUANIA, lAw ON CITIZENSHIP § 1 (1) 
(1991), available at http://www.litlex.lt/Litlex/Eng/Frames/Laws/Documents/55.HTM (last vis-
ited Nov. 2, 2004). Lithuania rejected Mr. Zadvydas' application for citizenship, stating that the 
documentation of his parents' citizenship (through which he would derive his own) was inad-
equate. 
140. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684. 
141. Id. at 684-85. 
142. Id. 
143. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer's majority 
opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas dissented. Zadvydas, 
533 U.S. 678. 
144. Id. at 701. 
145. /d. 
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presumably, back to the country of capture or origin.146 
No doubt many countries whose citizens are currently held as enemy 
combatants would allow these individuals to return home.147 However, 
the situation may not be that simple for everyone. A good number of 
individuals captured in Mghanistan are not Mghani citizens. Indeed, 
the lead plaintiff in &sul was a British citizen.148 It is unlikely that 
Mghanistan would be willing to accept these individuals. Unfortu-
nately, there are no guarantees that the individual's country of citizen-
ship would be willing to accept him back either. For example, the 
country of citizenship could conceivably claim that the individual 
expatriated himself by joining the Taliban. In fact, Saudi Arabia did 
expatriate Osama bin Laden,149 thus precluding him from returning 
there. Furthermore, there may be situations similar to that of Mr. 
Zadvydas', where the individual in question does not hold citizenship 
of any country. It is therefore not unfathomable that an individual 
adjudged by the court not to be an "enemy combatant" would have no 
country to which he could return. 
If a situation such as the one described above arises, under Rnsul and 
Zadvydas the Government would be obligated to release individuals 
captured on the field of battle into American society.150 Such a result is 
nothing short of absurd and grotesque. Yet it is the result one must 
reach if one is to follow Rasul and Zadvydas to their logical conclusion. 
The utter absurdity of such a result leads me to believe that the 
Supreme Court could not have possibly intended it. This is the most 
logical explanation. However, if this explanation is correct, the Court 
should have at least foreseen this possibility. By failing to address the 
146. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a) (6). 
147. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, 4 Detainees Are Returned to France After 2 Years at Guantanamo, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 27, 2004, at A5; see also Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690 (detailing nationalities of various 
petitioners, not one of whom was an Mghani national). 
148. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690 n.1. 
149. Jeff Gerth & Judith Miller, Terror Money: A Special Report; Funds for Terrorists Traced to 
Persian Gulf Businessmen, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1996, at Al (stating that Saudi Arabia revoked bin 
Laden's citizenship in 1994). 
150. To be sure, the Supreme Court in Zadvydasdid leave itself an out by specitying that it was 
not addressing a situation where terrorism was a concern. 533 U.S. at 696. That concession, 
however, is quite meaningless, for under the scenario described above, we are assuming that the 
courts have already determined that as far as they are concerned the individual seeking release is 
not an enemy combatant and a fortiori is not a terrorist. This of course does not mean that the 
person in question would not be considered dangerous by the military. Rather, it only means that 
the district court in habeas proceedings wasn't convinced that the person has taken up arms against 
the United States, and/or is dangerous. 
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consequences of granting the writ of habeas corpus to prisoners of 
undefined status (citizenship-wise), the Court has failed to give the 
Government proper guidance for dealing with detainees. The Court, of 
course, is not generally responsible for providing the Government with 
legal guidance beyond adjudicating specific disputes; however, when it 
radically changes the legal landscape, it should at the very least recog-
nize and explain the consequences and pitfalls of its own decisions. 
VI. THE WAY OUT OF THE MORASS 
Now that the Court has ruled and settled the issue of access to courts 
for those captured on the field of battle, the question is not necessarily 
whether the decision was right, but rather, what's next? Let there be no 
mistake, for the reasons stated above, I believe that the Court erred, at 
the very least, in the Rasul decision and was insufficiently clear in 
Hamdi. Nonetheless, the decision has been made, and now the Govern-
ment and the legal system must cope with the result. This Part proposes 
a three-pronged approach to dealing with the Supreme Court's deci-
sions. First, the lower-level courts, other than in the District of Colum-
bia, should utilize their discretion and refuse to entertain habeas 
petitions from Guantanamo Bay detainees. I51 Second, the courts should 
allow military commissions to adjudicate detainees' claimsI52 and limit 
judicial review to the adequacy of the proceedings before the military 
commissions. Third, in case a habeas petition is granted, the courts 
should allow the Government to reclassifY detainees as prisoners of war, 
thus allowing the Government the option of continuing to detain these 
individuals until the end of hostilities.I53 In cases where U.S. citizens 
are granted the writ, the Government should be able to criminally 
prosecute these individuals. I54 These limitations on the Court's deci-
sions would curb any damage that the Court's decisions may have on 
U.S. military and intelligence-gathering operations. 
Letting only a single district court entertain habeas petitions from 
Guantanamo Bay would address the problems that the Supreme Court 
raised in Padilla. Detainees would be prevented from forum shopping, 
and the Government would not have to defend various cases in a variety 
of jurisdictions. Such an approach would also prevent non-citizen 
detainees from enjoying greater rights than U.S. citizens. Thus, this 
151. See Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2004). 
152. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2651-52. 
153. See Geneva Convention, supra note 15, art. 118. 
154. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 
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approach would resolve the inconsistencies between Rasul and Pa-
dilla. 155 
Next, allowing military commissions to adjudicate the status of 
Guantanamo Bay Base detainees would appropriately balance the due 
process concerns expressed by the Court and the necessities of U.S. 
military and intelligence services. 156 By limiting detainees' forum to 
military commissions, the Government would be able to ensure that 
courts do not get involved prematurely, ruining any chance for success-
ful interrogation.157 This approach would also foreclose the possibility 
of detainees petitioning U.S. courts for writs of prohibition on transfer-
ring them to other countries or writs of mandamus, requiring the U.S. 
military to limit its interrogation techniques. Furthermore, this ap-
proach would resolve the tension between Hamdi and Rasul158 by 
explicitly recognizing that the impartial factfinder could be a military 
officer. Again, such a resolution would place U.S. and foreign citizens 
on equal footing, rather than (inexplicably) giving non-citizens more 
rights. Judicial review could still be available to verifY that military 
commissions are not kangaroo courts willing to rubber-stamp the 
Government's decision on the flimsiest of pretexts. Perhaps review 
could be conducted under a deferential "substantial evidence" stan-
dard. Such a review would assure the court that there is indeed 
evidence justifYing the classification of a prisoner as an enemy combat-
ant, while at the same time giving sufficient deference to the military's 
assessment of the situation as it existed on the field of battle where 
presumably capture occurred. The Administration has already moved 
forward with plans to set up such military review commissions. 159 
Courts should hold that this process comports with the holding in 
Rasul. 
Finally, in the event that habeas is granted, the courts should at all 
costs avoid the absurd situation described in Part V, supra. If habeas is 
granted, the courts should allow the Government, at the Government's 
election, to either release and deport these individuals or to continue 
holding them as POWs rather than as enemy combatants. This ap-
proach has several advantages. First, if the Government chooses to hold 
the detainees as POWs, it can continue doing so until the cessation of 
155. See supra Part IILB. 
156. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2651-52. 
157. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra Part lILA. 
159. See supra note 89. 
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hostilities. 160 The determination of when hostilities actually end would 
be squarely within the province of the Executive and Congress.161 
Courts will not have to guess as to when release is appropriate. This will 
prevent these individuals from (re)joining forces adverse to the United 
States. On the other hand, the detainees would be able to enjoy more 
rights, such as the ability to receive visits from the Red Cross, to receive 
mail and care packages, and to have the conditions of their confine-
ment monitored for any potential violations by independent observ-
ers.162 In short, the detainees would come within the ambit of the 
Geneva Convention's protections. In case a Zadvydas-like situation 
arises after hostilities are declared over, the Government would be able 
to keep the stateless individuals in a displaced persons camp, where 
they too would receive the protections of the relevant international 
treaties. 163 In such camps the Government could simultaneously seek 
to deport these individuals and re-educate them, so that if deportation 
is not possible, they could at some conceivable point be released. Such 
a process would allow the authorities to hold individuals past the six 
months limit established in Zadvydas, while at the same time ensuring 
that the detained individual e~oys communication with the outside 
world and other basic privileges. 
These mechanisms are likely to limit the interfering impact that the 
Court's decisions in the Enemy Combatant Cases may have on U.S. 
military and intelligence-gathering operations. They are not ideal, and 
possibly not exhaustive, but they are good initial steps towards reestab-
lishing a balance between the needs of the military and the concern of 
the courts. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court issued three seminal yet 
contradictory decisions. The interplay of these decisions, as well as 
their interaction with prior decisions of the Court, could impede the 
U.S. fight against terrorism. However imprudent these decisions may 
have been, the fact remains that today they are the law of the land. 
160. See Geneva Convention, supra note IS, art. lI8. 
161. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,214 (1962) ("[Elven in private litigation which directly 
implicates no feature of separation of powers, lack of judicially discoverable standards and the 
drive for even-handed application may impel reference to the political departments' determina-
tion of dates of hostilities' beginning and ending."). 
162. See generally Geneva Convention, supra note IS. 
163. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 2,19 V.S.T. 
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968). 
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Short of overruling them (an unlikely prospect in the near term), legal 
strategies meant to both implement the Court'sjudgments and protect 
U.S. military and security needs must be devised. Among these strate-
gies are limiting the forums for applications for the writ of habeas 
corpus, allowing the facts to be adjudicated by a military commission, 
with a deferential judicial review, and permitting the Government to 
continue holding individuals who successfully petitioned for habeas 
corpus, if the Government is willing to upgrade the status of the 
detainees to that of a POW. Putting these limitations on the Supreme 
Court's decisions may yet restore some coherence to the jurisprudence 
in this area. 
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